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Abstract
This paper reports on an ongoing comparative study of the development of digital
radio in Europe and Canada. Focussing on the Eureka 147 Digital Audio Broadcasting
(DAB) platform in Canada, of which it was an early adopter, the paper examines the
complex interaction of industry, government regulation and the difficulty of policy
formation matching the pace of technology development. Based on interviews with
leading radio professionals, the paper presents a critical review of the ‘transitional
policy’ towards the digitalisation of radio and examines the international market
pressures that led Canada to largely abandon this approach in favour of the current
multi-platform system. Despite extensive regulatory intervention to protect Canadian
interests, the dominant influence of the US market on Canadian broadcasting matters
is evident. Most recently, the entry of satellite-delivered subscription radio services
by XM Radio and Sirius have illustrated the difficulty of regulating against powerful,
global interests. Often seen as combining the best aspects of the European public
service system with the commercial success of the US industry, the current stage of
policy development in Canadian digital radio offers, it is argued, some important
lessons for similar developments in Europe.
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Digital technologies and the future of radio: lessons from the Canadian
experience

Introduction
Radio broadcasting is poised to undergo significant transformation over the coming
years as a number of new digital broadcasting technologies offer enhanced audio
quality and reception, integrated data and multimedia content, and more efficient use
of the radio spectrum. Digital Audio Broadcasting or DAB is the most established of
these technologies. Developed in Europe as the Eureka-147 standard in the mid1980s, DAB was also adopted by Canada and widely tested in the early 1990s. While
the progression to digital forms of delivery is an agreed objective of the radio
industry, there is less consensus on whether DAB offers the best means of achieving
this or whether there are more appropriate or expedient solutions. Patterns of
development internationally are now quite variable: some countries such as Canada
continue to promote DAB, but others, such as Ireland, are delaying implementation or
even withdrawing earlier deployments. Some ten years after its inception, the progress
of DAB internationally has been patchy and broadcasters and regulators are now
evaluating a number of other approaches to the realisation of a fully digital radio
landscape.
The current paper, building on a comparative approach to the study of the roll out of
digital radio developed within the Digital Radio Cultures in Europe research group
(DRACE), reports on the situation in Canada. The paper traces the background to the
deployment of digital radio in Canada and examines the prospects for a successful
implementation of Digital Audio Broadcasting. It reports also on alternative
technology platforms impacting on digital radio in Canada and examines some of the
key environmental factors for digital radio, including the regulatory regime,
availability and deployment of technology platforms, economic and market
considerations, as well as audience interest and adoption.

Based on fieldwork

conducted in Canada in 2005 during which key radio professionals and industry
analysts were interviewed, this paper offers a report on the situation up to the end of
2005 when the first new subscription-based digital satellite services were launched.1
It is argued that Canada offers a particularly useful example for comparative purposes
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due in part to its tradition of public service broadcasting based on European models,
as well as the leading role given to the regulator in developing policies designed to
support Canada’s role as a world player in digital technologies.
The introduction of digital radio, regardless of the system or platform adopted, offers
many opportunities and significant challenges for broadcasters and policy makers
alike. While the technical advantages of digital radio broadcasting have been amply
demonstrated, the business case is largely unproven and the future viability of any one
approach uncertain. A comparative approach, therefore, is a useful means of
analyzing the issues involved and potentially offers insights into the factors that will
most impact on the emerging digital landscape. Comparing the respective issues and
prospects for digital radio broadcasting in Canada and Europe provides an ideal
opportunity to examine questions of policy formation and implementation in quite
contrasting radio environments though with some underlying common features.
Canada and Europe share strong public service traditions in broadcasting through a
variety different economic models. In the case of Canada and Ireland, both support
vibrant private, commercial radio sectors with high levels of listenership. They have
as near neighbours major broadcast markets which impact strongly on the domestic
context and in part constrain the opportunity for development.

Competing platforms for digital radio
Radio, the oldest of electronically broadcast mass media, stands at a particularly
interesting point in its development in the early twenty first century. Digital means of
broadcasting offer new opportunities for value-added content, enhanced quality and
more efficient use of the radio spectrum (Hakanen, 1991). The European-developed
Eureka-147 standard known as Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) is the most
established of the new digital audio technologies in radio but increasing use of the
internet and satellite forms of distribution have also contributed to a significant reassessment of radio’s future (see Kozamernik, 2004).

Indeed, the anticipated

widespread adoption of wireless broadband applications and the use of radio-like
technologies to distribute multimedia content, including audio and radio on demand,
have led some to question the future of radio at all and ask whether it will in due
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course metamorphose into a new form of information and entertainment delivery
(DTI, 2004).
The international context for the adoption and implementation of new digital radio
technologies is a complex one (see Barboutis, 1997; Hendy, 2000; Lax, 2003; Dick et
al, 2003). DAB, with the support of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) was
widely adopted in most European countries throughout the 1990s, and has also been
deployed in Canada, Australia and in parts of South East Asia. While not the only
form of digital radio transmission, it has been described as the most revolutionary and
complete system, and the first big technological change in radio since the appearance
of FM, stereophony and transistors (Martínez-Costa, 2005). DAB’s progress has been
slow, however, in part due to sluggish governmental and regulatory support, the initial
unavailability of affordable receivers, and the general lack of enthusiasm on the part
of service providers to take advantage of DAB’s potential for value-added content.
The UK is the leading exception to this where there has been wider market acceptance
of the standard and strong incentives for content providers to develop DAB-only
services. However, the decision of YLE, the Finnish public broadcaster, to shut down
its DAB network in 2005 has sent a warning signal to the broadcast world that DAB
long-term may not be the only digital solution.2
Satellite digital radio, or SDARS has made its greatest impact in the United States
where two companies, XM Satellite Radio and Sirius, have been licensed to provide
SDARS services on a pay-subscription basis. Serving a potential audience of 270
million, SDARS offers a commercial-free, digital alternative to existing radio services
and is primarily aimed at in-car listening which accounts for some 50% of radio
listenership in the United States. Also in the United States, the reluctance of the FCC
(Federal Communications Commission) in the US to disrupt the established and
highly successful FM radio market led to its decision to adopt the IBOC (In Band On
Channel) system (Ala-Fossi, 2003). This is an approach which integrates analogue
and digital signals within the same transmission, thereby using existing spectrum but
without the addition of new services. Now branded as HD Radio, or high definition
radio, the IBOC system is something of a hybrid making the transition to digital easier
but limiting what it can offer. Another digital radio standard aimed at the re-utilisation
of the AM band (short, medium and long wave) is Digital Radio Mondiale (DRM). It
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promises near FM-quality with the capacity to integrate data and text on existing AM
frequencies. Offering improved reception and functionality over analogue AM, DRM
is a technically successful, non-proprietary system universal system but which one
awaits regulatory, market and broadcaster support.
While not directly a competing broadcast technology, the impact of the internet on
radio has also been significant and use of the internet as a means of providing added
information and on-demand services has been central to most broadcasters’ digital
strategy (Evans, 2001). The global reach of the internet and its widespread adoption
in everyday life have opened new possibilities for distribution of radio content as well
as the creation of new internet-only, online radio services. In addition, the internet’s
interactive features allows greater personalisation of radio content and the use of
communicative channels such as email and discussion forums for enhanced listener
involvement.

Internet-enhanced features may point towards some of the

characteristics of radio’s future but are not in themselves considered by broadcasters a
replacement of the one-way, point-to-multipoint wireless transmission that defines
radio.

However, emerging technologies utilising digital transmission to provide

mobile multimedia services and broadband access such as DMB (Digital Multimedia
Broadcasting) may provide another platform for radio in the future (Kozamernik,
2004).

Development of Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) in Canada
Canada, as Chouinard notes (1994: 59), has more often been a follower than a leader
in the development of new broadcast technologies. Yet in the case of digital radio,
Canada adopted the role of enthusiastic ‘early adopter’ and within the North
American context led the field in digital radio broadcasting during the 1990s. As early
as 1989, an ad-hoc advisory group under the auspices of the Canadian Association of
Broadcasters (CAB) began to advocate the idea of a national strategy to implement
the transition of the national broadcasting system from analogue to digital. The group
comprising public in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), and private
broadcasters represented by CAB, as well representatives of the Department of
Communications, led discussion of the various options available and organized
demonstrations of the Eureka 147/DAB system in 1990 (Chouinard et al, 1994: 58;
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Roman, 2006). Following the success of these trials and the enthusiasm expressed
across the radio sector for the project, a governmental Task Force for the Introduction
of Digital Radio in Canada was established in 1992 to advise on all relevant technical,
policy and regulatory matters. It issued its report in 1994, outlining detailed plans for
the relevant coverage and service issues as well as making recommendations on the
policy and regulatory implications.3

Digital Radio Research Inc. (DRRI), (later

Digital Radio Roll Out Inc) was established from the original consortium of private
broadcasters and the CBC, for the purpose of financing and managing facilities for
digital radio research and assuming responsibility as the official body mandated to
promote and organize public demonstrations of digital radio in Canada.
the lead of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU-R)

Following

who in 1994

recommended the Eureka-147 system as the global technical standard for terrestrial
and satellite radio broadcasting, Industry Canada formally adopted the standard for
digital broadcasting in Canada and allocated 40MHz of spectrum for the purpose in
the L-band range (1452-1492 MHz).
From the start, digital radio broadcasting and the Eureka 147 standard was intended to
be a replacement technology and therefore much of the planning for its
implementation was based around compatibility with existing services. Radio was
seen to be in a period of transition at the end of which analogue systems of
transmission and reception would be completely replaced by digital technology. In
order to facilitate the transition, existing radio licence holders would be given priority
access to the digital radio band.

The development of a new band for radio

broadcasting was also viewed as a good way of enabling expansion in the sector.
There was little capacity left for FM development and AM with its inferior sound
quality could in one transition be upgraded to a much superior system.4 The policy
governing the introduction of digital radio was published by the government
regulator, the CRTC in 1995 and outlined a two-staged approach whereby the
Commission would first license digital radio undertakings on this transitional basis.5
Later, a public process would be initiated to consider all aspects of digital radio
broadcasting in the longer term. The policy adopted involved granting licences to all
incumbent operators who wished to use digital facilities to provide a simulcast of their
existing services, licences which would remain in effect until a long-term digital radio
policy was developed. Licence holders would have some opportunity during the
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transitional period to develop separate programming for their digital services, limited
to 14 hours per week. Applications for new licences or for additional services would
only be considered on a case by case basis and subject to Commission’s policy of
supporting the existing radio market.
Canada’s support of Euerka 147 in the L-Band was not without controversy
(Chouinard, 1994: 60).

Its support of a wideband transmission technology was

justified on the basis of ensuring high quality audio and maximum spectrum
efficiency. The choice of wideband using L-Band spectrum was in contrast to the
approach adopted elsewhere and was justified on the basis that it would offer superior
quality, that it wouldn’t interfere with existing AM/FM services and that it offered the
best potential for value-added data services. All existing AM and FM licensees were
allocated frequencies for each in the 1452-1492 MHz L-Band and an allotment plan
was developed in each of the major metropolitan areas to allow the digital service to
match as closely as possible the coverage of existing stations. This involved defining
DAB coverage around the largest FM station within any given market and grouping
up to 5 existing FM stations into a single multiplex. Replacement of wide area AM
stations was restricted to the largest equivalent, though smaller, FM coverage area.
As a replacement technology, stations were licensed only to simulcast existing
services and were not permitted to offer new or additional services. Equally, no new
licences were to be offered for the duration of the transition nor would any new
operators be enabled to enter the market.
From the industry point of view, broadcasters expressed a commitment to the future
of radio as digital and argued that the best course of action to develop its potential was
an industry-wide co-ordinated effort to oversee its development.

Among the

arguments offered was the fact that listeners’ increasing use of CDs and other digital
audio devices led to audience expectations of higher quality that only a digital system
could provide. Studios and many parts of the production process were undergoing a
process of digitalization and it appeared logical that this would in due course be
extended to the transmission system. Technically, a digital system, it was argued,
could provide a more robust and reliable service to the portable and mobile listener
and in particular provide a much-improved service to the automobile listener. A
further incentive for broadcasters was the potential to become players in the
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development and roll-out of digital services and considerable emphasis was given to
the potential new revenue streams that might become available with DAB’s data
carrying abilities.
DRRI’s recommendations on programming practices for digital radio outlined
features it was hoped would drive the development DAB and make it a highly
attractive consumer product.6 These included a consistent approach to displaying
station name and format and as the technology developed the opportunity to display
logos and other graphical information; dynamic labels to display information about
whatever is currently playing on air. Using available data capacity, stations could also
offer programming enhancements, interviews, breaking news, weather forecasts,
different languages, etc. For example, if a consumer is listening to a song on air, they
could push that station's sub-channel button to hear an interview with the artist.
Finally, a listener access to a 'tell me more' button which would provide additional
information about a programming feature or an advertiser, eventually leading to
interactive e-commerce applications.
Parnis (2000) attributes this aggressive and pro-active approach to a recognition
within the radio industry that in the early to mid 1990s radio as a medium had entered
a period of decline and could be swiftly overtaken by new digital services if it did not
adapt to the new environment. The representative industry group, DRRI put forward
the argument that ‘Every communication medium is embracing the superior quality
and increased capacity made possible by digital technology. In today's competitive
marketplace, radio must keep pace, providing the highest quality of sound and an
array of new and appealing services that ensures that radio remain a dynamic media.’
In this context, DAB was represented ‘as a revolutionary audio broadcasting
technology, which dramatically improves sound quality, and signal reliability and will
enable you to receive a host of new services through your radio’.7

Against the

background of increasing competition from the web and the potential threat from
other digital audio services, DAB was heavily promoted as the best technology
available:
DAB delivers a variety of fundamental benefits. Based on Eureka 147
technology, it has numerous advantages over both current analogue
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transmission and the more recent audio streaming via the World Wide Web.
"digital" offers both outstanding CD quality sound and portability. It will lead
to host of data display services for the consumer including geographic
positioning, traffic and weather information, advertising supplements, song
credits and a good deal more. All the while the listener is treated to
interference-free reception. DAB's "point to multi-point" capabilities serve to
illustrate the Web's "point-to-point" limitations and afford digital radio stations
the opportunity to play to a much wider audience. (Bray 2000)
There were also a number of important economic arguments, from an industry point
of view, in favour of DAB. Following the initial investment in new transmission
equipment, there would be greatly reduced operating costs for broadcasters given the
much lower power requirement for DAB compared to FM and AM. The potential for
new pay or subscription-based services were also an important incentive as a means of
growing radio revenues.

In addition, however, there was also a sense of the

inevitability of the transition to digital and a fear that not being part of this would
severely jeopardize radio’s business foundation. As expressed by one commentator in
2000:
The success of DAB is critical to broadcast owners as the only way to protect
the value of their properties. It is inevitable that AM and FM must give way to
superior technology. After extensive research, the logical next step clearly
appears to be DAB. Current license holders are the first to be granted the new
digital licenses by the CRTC. Owners thereby continue to hold and control an
extremely valuable portion of the broadcast "real estate". (Bray 2000)
The pro-digital radio lobby in Canada could claim considerable optimism for the
prospects for DAB in Canada in its initial inception phase. The groundwork and
development for DAB in Canada was described as a textbook case of cooperation
among the many players involved (Chouinard, 1994: 79). The relatively small group
at DRRI who pioneered and championed the cause of digital radio and DAB in
particular, ensured that the technology had been perfected and standardized, the
necessary spectrum had been obtained and generally a solid foundation was in place
for large scale implementation (Edwards 2001). Once the process moved out of the
planning phase and into domain of implementation subject to market conditions and
consumer behaviour, it would become more diffused and uncontrolled but, it was
hoped, with sufficient marketing, public information and availability at a reasonable
cost, consumers would be clamouring for DAB (Bray, 2000).
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An official launch of digital radio in Canada took place in 1999 at the convention of
the Canadian Association of Broadcasters and a steady roll out of stations with DAB
services proceeded in key metropolitan areas. Within a short period, there were some
57 stations broadcasting in DAB, reaching 35 per cent of the population, some 10
million listeners in Toronto, Montreal, Windsor, and Vancouver, with a further launch
of DAB services in Ottawa to follow. By 2002, the CAB’s vice president of radio
could confidently declare that sufficient progress had been made to claim Canada’s
emergence as a world leader in digital radio (Cavanagh, 2002: 30). A major boost to
the marketing of DAB was the announcement by General Motors of Canada of its
plans to install DAB receivers as standard equipment in its vehicles for the 2003
model year. Also in that year, DRRI commissioned an engineering study to extend the
coverage of DAB nationally in corridors between the major metropolitan centres.
Significant progress also appeared to be underway in receiver availability: Radio
Shack Canada announced it would carry a range of home and portable DAB consumer
products across its stores. The development of a new DAB chip by Texas Instruments
also promised greatly reduced prices for receivers and the first DAB/FM personal
portable dropping below the psychologically all important $100 became available.

What went wrong for DAB in Canada?
Despite many positive early indications, DAB in the succeeding years has clearly not
lived up to expectations nor developed in Canada in any sustained way. Officially,
there are currently 73 licensed DAB stations in Canada, of which 62 are fully
operational: 25 in Toronto, 15 in Vancouver, 12 in Montreal, 6 in Windsor, and 4 in
Ottawa serving nearly 11 million potential listeners. However, listenership is low and
not even monitored by BBM Canada. DAB receivers are not readily available either
for home, portable or car use. Industry professionals are generally despondent and
regard the ten years since 1995 when DAB was first rolled out as an unproductive,
stalled or even failed period of development.8 In common with the experience of other
countries, the project of digital radio based on a single platform such as Eureka-147 is
now being called into question with little prospect of it being revived any time soon.
There are a number of complex reasons underlying this which call into question some
of the initial assumptions made about the roll out of DAB in Canada as well as
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additional external factors over which it could be said there was very little control.
From this emerge some lessons from the Canadian case which will find resonances
elsewhere and ultimately have some important implications for the consideration of
the digital future of radio as a medium. Reasons underpinning the failure of DAB in
Canada can be grouped under three headings: the lack of consumer response; sectoral
or industry responses; and policy issues.
Consumer Response
In the first place there was a very poor consumer response to the development of DAB
in Canada and at no time over its 10 year history could it be said that digital radio
firmly took hold. There was poor awareness of the service, or indeed even the
existence of the new technology and its potential benefits for radio listening. There
were particular difficulties with the supply of receiver equipment and it was
erroneously assumed that a range of equipment would follow with the take up of DAB
in Europe. Despite the promotional activity of DRRI as the mandated body to create
awareness of DAB and its benefits, the fact that receivers were largely unavailable or
difficult to source proved extremely damaging to the prospects of an early take up of
DAB. Initial costs of around $2000 for high end consumer receivers gave DAB an
elite, audiophile image which proved difficult to subsequently to shake off. Lower
cost receivers once they reached the market performed poorly adding further
difficulties to any potential increase in supply of receiver equipment. The issue of
receiver availability cuts to the core of the issue around digital radio in that with an
installed based of approximately 75 million AM/FM receivers, consumers needed
very compelling reasons to change to a new and relatively untested technology.
With the poor availability of consumer receivers and in many instances poor quality
of what was available, the much-heralded enhanced features of the digital radio
listening experience proved to be unattainable or below expectations. The assumption
that the promise of enhanced CD-like audio quality would be the unique selling
feature of the new technology proved unfounded in nearly all markets and especially
so in Canada. Some industry figures maintain that this was a failure of marketing but
it remained a chicken and egg problem compounded by a lack of interest by
manufacturers to invest in new product lines pending greater consumer demand. It
was also the case that many of the promised additional data services did not arrive

12
either with many stations sticking conservatively to a simulcast of their analogue
services. Despite initial enthusiasm for the possibilities of data services, with the
exception of CHUM, none really materialized.
Of particular significance to the Canadian market was the ultimate failure to deliver
DAB as a standard feature of the automobile market. Given the importance of
automobile radio listening in North America generally, the tie-in with OEM (or
original equipment manufacturers) for the automotive sector was crucial to the
successful adoption of DAB. The surprise success of DRRI in getting a commitment
from General Motors Canada for installation of DAB receivers in its 2003 models
proved short lived when difficulties emerged over supply of equipment and
engineering a segregation of the Canadian market for those areas where DAB was
available. According to DRRI’s president at the time, what General Motors required
was a commitment and a timetable for the roll-out on a national level of DAB to
enable them to commission digital receivers as standard equipment across their entire
range.9 When this wasn’t forthcoming, General Motors pulled back and like the rest
of the sector began to adopt ‘a wait and see’ approach.10 As a result, the only option
available for DAB in-car listening was an after-market installation of a new receiver
which proved unpopular, adding to low profile of DAB in the marketplace.
Industry Support
From a sectoral perspective, a major question mark over the decision to adopt Eureka147 began to emerge once it was clear that the US were proceeding in a different
direction. Canada’s decision to adopt L-Band DAB was made in the knowledge that
this would not be followed in the United States as most of that spectrum was
unavailable or already allocated for military purposes. The initial response of the
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) in the United States to L-Band DAB
using Eureka-147 was positive, and the system was acknowledged to have performed
well in all tests. Difficulties began to emerge as early as 1992, however, when the
implications of developing a replacement technology for the United States market
were considered. Major concern was expressed about the impact of a new technology
on existing FM stations in the most developed markets. Under pressure from industry
interests, therefore, US policy was constrained by the need to develop a digital system
that would disrupt the existing service in any way. The fact that DAB was a
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European-originated technology ill-equipped to meet the different needs of the US
market, 11 in addition to the potential disruptive spectrum allocation difficulties that
might be experienced ensured that by 1992 DAB was off the agenda in the United
States. In due course, the adoption of IBOC, the proprietary in-band, on channel
technical solution developed by iBiquity Digital Corporation, placed Canada and the
US squarely at odds with radically different approaches to digital radio
broadcasting.12 It was assumed that as radio was primarily a local medium, the fact
that competing and incompatible systems were being used either side of the border
would not matter in the end. Experience has shown, however, the difficulty of
Canada pursuing a different course to its near neighbour and without doubt the
adoption of IBOC in the United States even with its technical limitations contributed
to the growing unease among industry members about the wisdom of their DAB
policy. In spite of the fact, that the Eureka 147 DAB approach is acknowledged to be
technically superior, many industry executives now openly admit that successful
implementation of IBOC in the United States would present a new scenario for
considering its suitability for Canada.
An interesting argument made in favour of accepting IBOC in Canada illustrates the
change in thinking around the transition to digital radio.13 Given the robustness of
FM analogue broadcasting and wide consumer satisfaction with the quality it
provides, it has been argued that IBOC may be ‘good enough’ and potentially an
expedient and pragmatic solution to incrementally making a transition to digital
broadcasting, while building on the success of FM. Admittedly, IBOC has a lower
bitrate compared to DAB and much less data handling capacity, yet for all that the
additional features that DAB has promoted heavily have proven not to be of
significant interest to listeners. The IBOC solution, focuses on the core business of
radio as transmitting localised audio programming and if IBOC under its brand name
of ‘HD Radio’ provides an enhanced listening experience attractive to listeners, then
the Canadian industry would be foolish not to follow suit. This argument would gain
even greater urgency should IBOC prove sufficiently successful and with sufficient
penetration of reception equipment to promote discussion of analogue switch-off date
as is the case with digital television.
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Further objections to DAB likewise began to be raised following DRRI’s engineering
study to extend DAB coverage. The proposal to establish a transmission network in a
series of corridors between major metropolitan centres in order to reach a broader
section of the population emerged as a prohibitively expensive proposition. Three
corridors had been identified: in the Vancouver region; Calgary to Edmonton; and a
Windsor to Quebec city corridor in order to achieve 65% to 75% coverage of the
Canadian population at a cost of 145 million dollars. One of the interesting outcomes
from the corridor study, was that it became abundantly clear that the kind of coverage
achieved with L-Band DAB was very similar to the coverage of a cellular
infrastructure with high field strength areas near the transmitter and then two or three
zones of lower strength signal. The practicalities of using L-Band DAB as a
replacement technology for the more powerful ‘C’ Class FM 100kW transmitters
began to look more and more improbable in the Canadian topography or at least at a
cost to coverage ratio that made little sense.14
Ten years on from the formal launch of DAB as the digital standard in Canada, the
actual level of support for the project from industry has been called into question.
While there was strong initial enthusiasm for what DAB had to offer in the early
1990s and a high level of initiative and support lent by private broadcasters to the
project, its failure to take off on a more general level either internationally or in the
Canadian market led to a gradual cooling of enthusiasm if not outright withdrawal of
support. Once the US had decisively rejected DAB, an analogy began to be drawn
with the ill-fated AM Stereo technology that had been unsuccessfully attempted in the
1980s and in which the industry had suffered some major losses. Thus, psychological
brakes began to be applied at a relatively stage despite the fact that the industry had
agreed a digital transition policy and a strategy for its implementation.

Steve

Edwards, one of DAB’s longtime supporters in Canada, pointedly observes that with
all of the supposed commitment to the project, more money was spent by his company
on upgrading a small rural station from AM to FM than was invested in ten years on
DAB.15 The restructuring of DRRI and the effective winding up of its promotional
and marketing activities in 2004 was formal acknowledgement of the changed attitude
towards DAB.

Effectively subsumed within the Canadian Association of

Broadcasters, DRRI would continue to have a monitoring and advisory role, as well as
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a watching brief on existing L-Band spectrum allocation, but with no new initiatives
planned for the advancement of DAB in Canada.16
The overall rather restrained level of support from the industry for DAB was in
particular evidence in the relatively low profile adopted by CBC, the national public
broadcaster. In contrast to the United Kingdom, where the BBC has played a leading
role in the development and the roll out of the technology or in Singapore where the
Singapore Broadcast Authority has likewise been to the forefront of DAB
implementation, CBC has been a participant rather than a leader in DAB. A member
of the original Task Force for the Introduction of Digital Radio and a fifty per cent
partner in DRRI, CBC was an active and equal participant in industry efforts to steer
the sector towards the digital domain. However, CBC was not a champion of DAB in
the sense of pioneering new programme strategies or lending major promotional
support to the project. DAB was effectively co-opted as one of a number of options in
an overall new media strategy which included the web, subscription digital audio
services via cable and more recently satellite broadcasting.

In part due to the

downsizing of the engineering function within CBC (Lavers, 2006), the emphasis for
the corporation was a programming one and was based on a commitment to make
programming available across all new platforms, not just DAB.17 While CBC is now
experimenting with newer applications such DMB (Digital Multimedia Broadcasting)
using DAB technology, its interest in digital terrestrial radio per se has waned
considerably.18

Policy Considerations
A conclusion offered by many participants in this study was that the policy developed
for the transition to digital, while perhaps appropriate for the time, was based on a
number of false assumptions which proved over the succeeding years to be the wrong
decisions for the Canadian radio industry.
The central feature of the policy towards a digital transition was that DAB would be a
replacement technology for analogue AM and FM transmission. This approach was
determined by the industry itself and had its origins in the desire to improve the
quality of AM broadcasting which continues to be an important of the Canadian
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broadcast landscape. Industry representatives were also concerned that unless the
digital transition was managed on the basis of a replacement of the existing
transmission network, a licensing round for L-Band spectrum would be likely to bring
a series of new entrants to the marketplace who could potentially disrupt the entire
industry. In a not dissimilar situation to the United States where incumbents based
their entire strategy on preventing any new competition and for this reason adopted a
system that worked within an existing waveband, the Canadian strategy was premised
on the assumption that a rapid transition would take place and that all existing
broadcasters would migrate to the digital domain.
The regulatory framework for digital radio was based on this assumption and as a
result ‘transitional’ licenses were issued to all incumbents who wished to upgrade
their transmission services to digital, on the understanding that this was for the
purposes of simulcasting existing signals over the transitional period. However, no
timeline was in put in place and the roll out of DAB from the start was ill-defined.
From a regulatory point of view, the CRTC agreed a two-staged process. In the first
instance, experimental licences granted stations the right to use a digital channel for
simulcasting but were prohibited from using the ancillary (data) channels available for
programming or for any service that would compete with or degrade the primary
programming signal. A broad process of public consultation would follow, initially
estimated within a period of three years, to develop the long term digital radio
policy.19
The lack of flexibility given to experimentation with new content derived in part from
ownership rules governing radio in Canada which restricts companies from owning
more than two AM and two FM holdings in any one market. The transitional licence
was not considered an additional service for ownership purposes, at least for the
transitional period. Substantial new programming would however constitute a new
service and incumbents who wished to develop new digital-only services would have
to relinquish some of their valuable existing analogue services. The CRTC having
granted incumbents priority access to new digital channels in the first place could not
increase that allocation further for the purposes of experimental digital programming
and, in any event, had to protect the public interest and ensure diversity in the
broadcast landscape.

What has emerged subsequently is a form of regulatory
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paralysis with an initial allocation of spectrum and licensing and no further room for
manoeuvre until substantial progress has been made in the development of a proven
service.
This transitional regime has in effect continued to the present and no consultative
process of long term strategy for digitalization has ever been instituted.

The

restrictions placed on experimental licences remain in effect, preventing the
development of new programming services and limiting additional content to alphanumeric text. Few, if any, new entrants have been licensed and the lack of any
permanent licensing structure has meant a lack of interest on the part of investors in
developing new digital services on the DAB platform.
The issue of stand-alone licences for DAB has been a contentious one and illustrates
the kind of stalemate that the industry as a whole is experiencing on its digital policy.
Interestingly, the pressure for additional, digital only licences has come not from
within the mainstream broadcast sector but from the field of ethnic broadcasting.
With an expanding diverse and multicultural population in each of its major cities,
there has been an ongoing and increasing demand for the provision of new ethnic
broadcast services.20

Over half the population of the greater metropolitan area of

Toronto, for instance, is comprised of ethnically diverse communities with some 55
distinct ethnic groups in over 45 languages. While currently there are 6 full service
ethnic radio stations, there is enormous demand for new services. Additional niche
ethnic broadcasting has been provided by the use of SCMO (subsidiary
communications multiplex operation) services, using ancillary spectrum capacity
available on FM and leased by existing broadcast licence holders. Special receiving
equipment is required for the service but its success as demonstrated by the 12 SCMO
operations in the Greater Toronto Area has shown the potential of new channels using
dedicated technology for specific niche applications or community uses.
In 2003, the first stand-alone DAB radio service, Sur Sagar Radio Inc. was licensed in
the Toronto areas to deliver a service aimed at the South Asian community in the
region, broadcasting in Punjabi, Hindi, Urdu and Gujarati, as well as English. The
CAB objected to the license application on the basis that stand-alone licences were
not appropriate given the embryonic stage of the DAB sector.21 The CAB feared, and
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argued as such with the CRTC, that opening up the licensing of stand-alone digital
stations would initiate a ‘gold rush’ for spare spectrum, before the business case had
been established or proven. It appealed again to the market-driven approach outlined
in the Policy for the Introduction of Digital Radio (1995) which protected the current
structure of the industry pending a full and complete transition to digital.

In reply,

Sur Sagar argued that a new approach to digital radio was now required which would
be based on programme innovation, and risks being taken by new entrants to the
market in order to counteract the stalled implementation of digital radio. In strongly
worded terms, Sur Sagar argued that the spectrum was “public property, not the
private reserve of those who have experimented.” The CRTC’s supported the case
and justified a one-off licence on the basis that “offering an entire schedule of unique
programming for a specialised audience adds value to digital radio and could advance
the rollout of the special receiver necessary to receive such programming.”22

This

was an important decision and one which could have important consequences for a
reorientation of DAB policy. Operational difficulties have to date however hindered
the development of the Sur Sagar service and the success of its implementation
remains uncertain.23
A coda of sorts to this phase of DAB in Canada is provided by the proposal of CHUM
Ltd., the Canadian communications conglomerate, to provide a subscription radio
service across Canada on a DAB network. Satellite radio made a high profile entry
into the Canadian market in 2005 when both XM and Sirius platforms were licensed
to operate their subscription service under revised Canadian broadcasting
regulations.24 With knowledge of the impending entry of both satellite giants, a third
application for a terrestrial digital subscription service was submitted by CHUM and
also approved though subsequently never launched. Controversially, where the bulk
of the satellite’s music service of over 100 channels was not subject to the normal
Canadian content regulations, CHUM’s proposal as a terrestrial service was licensed
under the normal content rules for all Canadian broadcast services.
CHUM’s proposal was for a terrestrial DAB service with conditional access, and
providing 50 channels initially, subsequently growing to 100 channels for a $9.95
CDN monthly subscription. CHUM signed a technology agreement with RadioScape
in the UK to develop receivers specifically for the subscription service which could
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also be used to pick up regular, non-subscription DAB channels. Receivers would also
include a card slot for adding removable memory for recording, a RAM cache for
live-pause and replay features, and an integrated receiver/MP3 player, designed
specifically for the youth market. In order to achieve the density required to allow a
50 channel service in addition to current DAB allocations for AM and FM
replacement, the data compression ratios would be reduced to 128 kbps for stereo
from its current 256 kilobits per second.

More advanced codecs providing an

approximate doubling of spectral efficiency), and /or the allocation of a "modest
amount" of additional spectrum beyond the current 1452-1492 MHz DAB band were
also proposed (Pizzi 2005).
CHUM’s submission argued that its proposal would work with conventional radio by
acting as a complementary service, providing a platform for greater industry
involvement as content partners and, crucially, would play an instrumental role in
driving penetration of digital radio by bringing to market affordable and
technologically advanced receivers. Citing the contrast with the UK, where DAB has
been a success story, CHUM argued that the missing Canadian element was content
and that this proposal contained the appropriate mix of innovative, Canadianproduced content to drive a successful digital transition.
CHUM’s service is a really a case of ‘what might have been’ and much of the
industry response to the proposal considered it a ‘spoiler’ application against the two
dominant satellite bids which had already made inroads into the Canadian market.25
While it addressed salient issues in respect of Canada’s policy in digital radio and
offered a pro-Canadian solution to leading the digital transition, the response of the
regulator, which was to effectively let the market decide, underlined the weakness of
the Canadian position in digital radio. Decisive intervention in progressing the digital
transition was effectively led by developments in the US, initially by its rejection of
DAB and development of an in-band solution and subsequently with the
encroachment of US satellite footprints on the Canadian marketplace. The fact that
no special protection was afforded the Canadian approach in 2005 effectively spelt the
end of the strategy of migrating the industry onto the Eureka 147 platform.

20
Future Options for DAB
Summing up what has been a long and unproductive ten years since the initial
introduction of DAB into Canada, one radio executive candidly remarked:
I believe it was a waste of time and money and we are still sitting here with
nothing. I never understood (it). I said from day one there's no indication that
consumers want replacement technology. They don't see our signal being as
bad as we think they think it is. And I don’t think we ever researched it
correctly. In terms of our plan which was always to put our existing stations
on a new platform and transition - waste of time, money and no demand.26
Michael McEwen, former CBC radio executive and past president of the World DAB
Forum, described four conditions required for a successful transition to digital. The
first condition is spectrum availability for the proposed new digital transmission
environment. The second is a commitment from broadcasters to fill that spectrum.
Thirdly, listeners need a value-added incentive to buy into the service with enhanced
programming, data and ancillary services. And finally, a commitment is needed from
the consumer electronics industry to ensure a near-ubiquitous supply of consumer
electronic devices at affordable consumer prices. Unless these four conditions were
met, each would in some way become a barrier to a successful transition. In the case
of Canada, it could be argued that there was market failure in three out of the four.27
The assumption that the superior audio quality of DAB alone would drive the
transition from analogue to digital, as CD had achieved a replacement of vinyl, was
unfounded. Analogue broadcasting and FM in particular have proved remarkably
robust and its quality such that the differentiation between DAB and good quality FM
was not significant.

Rather than replacement of one platform for another, the

experience has in fact been over the period concerned an insatiable demand for new
and additional services to the extent that capacity, particularly in FM, has been
reached in most major markets.
Despite this, most executives agree that DAB will have some role in the future of
digital radio in Canada. If for no other reason than the fact that a network is in place
and stations have been allocated valuable shares of L-Band spectrum, there is a sense
that a number of potential future applications are possible for DAB in Canada.
Following the lead of the proposed CHUM digital subscription service, many of the
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leading players in what is now a highly converged radio sector with four main
corporations controlling the vast bulk of the industry are now well positioned to
introduce new, value-added additional services as a spin-off from conventional core
broadcasting business. The regulatory provision does not at present provide for such
applications and given strict ownership rules operators are disincentivised from
deviating from analogue broadcasting.
In its long promised review of the commercial radio sector, the CRTC has now
formally incorporated a review of the transitional digital radio policy and called for
submissions different aspects of the 1995 policy.28 Acknowledging the stalled switchover, the CRTC asks whether the replacement strategy should now be reconsidered
and if so what the status of existing DAB stations now in operation should be. It asks
whether the policy should now be modified to enable new entrants into the market,
specifically if digital radio could provide better services for diverse cultural and ethnic
communities, and how additional DAB spectrum might be obtained or made
available. However, DAB is no longer treated as the sole transitional digital platform
and the policy framework now directly address the issue of whether IBOC should be
permitted in Canada as well as asking what provision should be made for other
standards, such as DRM, DMB, and DVB-H. In addition, new and emerging Internet
distribution platforms such file-sharing, podcasting, downloading, and audio
streaming, including fixed locations and wireless systems such as Wi-Fi and WiMAX
and the promise of Internet-based services for car reception, all radically change the
nature of any proposed digital transition. In the words of the commission, ‘the new
audio programming alternatives pose an unprecedented challenge for the conventional
radio sector that will require astute business decisions and a judicious regulatory
approach’.29
In its submission to the CRTC, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters supports the
abandonment of the ‘replacement technology’ notion of digital radio broadcasting and
advocates a flexible regulatory approach as the central element of a re-vamped policy
for digital radio.30 A long term strategy is required, the CAB argue, to ensure that
radio services of national, regional and local interest, will continue to be delivered
reliably and free of charge to fixed, portable and mobile services.

The digital

transition policy, therefore, remains crucially important when set against a
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background of declining audiences particularly among younger listeners for
conventional radio, as well as the ongoing fragmentation of the market by
unregulated, Internet-delivered audio services.

Flexible arrangements enabling

stations to experiment with innovative programming models and ideas would, it is
argued, provide a much needed boost for attracting listeners to digital and should
include a relaxation of Canadian content regulations for digital services, at least until
meaningful listenership levels were achieved, and more flexible consideration of
ownership rules, enabling stations to experiment on their digital services without
having to relinquish an equivalent property. While new programming is proposed as a
driver for any new impetus on the terrestrial digital radio broadcasting, simulcasting
as appropriate is also envisaged as a means of encouraging migration of analogue to
digital. The analogy is drawn with the migration of AM to FM in the 1950s and 60s
whereby a gradual increase of peak-listening programming was successfully
transferred to the FM band, once initial listenership began to take hold. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the CAB argue that incumbents are best positioned to provide
programming services and advocate continued priority given to existing broadcasters
to digital allocations. However, new entrants are acknowledged to have a role and a
mechanism for releasing unused spectrum by current licence-holders is proposed.
More efficient use of the spectrum whether through AAC source coding and/or
reviewing the current generous data rates of 256 kbits/sec would also free up
considerable room for expansion and enable the kind of quantity envisaged for digital
programming services on a par with equivalent Internet or satellite-based services.
Prior to the formation of new Canada-wide policy for digital broadcasting, it is
accepted that there is now no longer one simple solution. As the CAB argue in their
submission:
It is simply not realistic to assume that a successful digital transition will be no
more than the replacement of the existing business with minor additions and
adjustments. Nor does digital transition necessarily mean the destruction of the
old business and the creation of a new one.31
A successful transition to digital in the Canadian context will be based on a ‘good
value proposition’ that includes new content, affordable receivers, promotion, and
competitive technical features. It will continue to include DAB as part of the equation
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but one which is as likely to include variants of the Eureka 147 system, as well
options for IBOC, Internet distribution and technologies for distribution to hand-held
mobile devices.

Conclusion
Drawing together the many different issues that have arisen over the course of the
transitional digital radio era in Canada, the following may be advanced as some of the
over-riding lessons of the Canadian experience.
1. In the first instance, the experience of Canada in attempting to implement
DAB illustrates the classic disadvantage of being an early adopter of new
technologies. Canada’s early and leading role in DAB implementation was
well established. It participated actively in the World DAB forum, a leading
Canadian executive serving as President, as well as in the respective technical
standards groups. It succeeded in galvanising wide industry support including
relevant government, private and public broadcaster interest and developed a
coherent strategy based on the information available at the time and the
context in which radio operated. However, as discussed in the foregoing, all
of this came to nought with the lack of availability of receivers and insufficient
development of receiver technology.
2. The second lesson that can be drawn from the Canadian experience is its
illustration of the difficulty of the broadcast regulatory regime or framework
keeping pace with technological change. Canada’s transitional digital radio
policy was set in 1995 and based solely around the implementation of DAB as
a replacement technology AM and FM. It did not, or could not, take account
then or subsequently of the increasingly complex technological domain that
broadcasting was facing, including the development of IBOC in the US,
advances in compression technologies for transmission, Internet distribution
and new developments in multimedia broadcasting. The regulatory gap was
particularly exposed with the launch of satellite radio and the manner in which
it made its entry into the Canadian broadcast environment. The licensing of
the XM and Sirius satellite platforms showed how unprepared the Canadian
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system was for effectively predatory encroachments on platforms that had not
been previously planned for.
3. It might be argued that the example of how the digital transition has been
handled in Canada points up the weakness of a laissez-faire or market-driven
approach. The regulatory position of the CRTC combines a responsibility to
defend the public interest as well as to respond to the business needs of the
sector. Its transitional digital radio policy was based on facilitating an
industry-led initiative on the road ahead. The disadvantages of this approach
have already been discussed with particular reference to the potential conflicts
involved when incumbents have responsibility for developing long term
policy.

Neither the regulator nor the public broadcaster in the Canadian

example intervened to adopt a more direct or leadership role in the roll-out of
a digital policy.

This, arguably, is in contrast to the more successful

interventionist approach adopted in the UK.
4. Fourthly, as illustrated by the Canadian experience, the transition to digital
broadcasting is not simply one of replacement technology. Where the debate
up to and including 1995 envisaged a total migration of the radio broadcasting
landscape onto a fully digital system, the reality has been shown to be much
more complex. Unlike the case of television where there is an industry
momentum towards realising a digital system and a gathering consensus
around analogue switch-off deadlines, the same can not be said for radio.
Digital broadcasting for the foreseeable future will be complementary to
conventional analogue broadcasting and its strategy will be tailored as such.
5. As a follow up, it can be seen from the case of digital radio in Canada that
analogue broadcasting and FM in particular has proved to be remarkably
robust, reliable and successful as a means of providing free to air broadcast
services. The supposed greatly enhanced audio quality of DAB was not
sufficient or sufficiently significant to enable the digital transition in Canada.
With a huge installed user base of at least 70 million receivers in Canada, as
well as considering the ease with which FM receivers can be incorporated into
cell phones and mobile devices, it will be a considerable time before the issue
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of replacement returns to the agenda. Indeed, in contrast to many European
markets, the Canadian radio market shows how underdeveloped many FM
markets are in the European context and scope that exists for further
development.
6. As shown in other markets also, Canada is further proof of the
acknowledgment that the transition to digital radio will take longer than any
one originally thought.
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